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Introduction
The variety of policy and philosophical positions that exist with respect to the legitimacy
and functionality of central banking is vast, and this paper aims to address how these positions
align with the traditional notions of the ‘left-right’ political spectrum. This research project aims
to create a typology of monetary policy and central bank philosophies based on political
ideology. The project will attempt to identify group differences in the perception of central
bank legitimacy, central bank functionality, monetary policy, and the role of central banks in
broader society. The methodology that will be employed is as follows. Prominent entities of
various political ideologies will be identified, these include individual politicians, political
parties, and think tanks. Database searches will be conducted that aim to collect quotes,
campaign platform portions, academic articles, and opinion pieces of the various prominent
entities that relate to central banks or monetary policy. The collected information from these
database searches will be analyzed in order to identify any commonalities and differences
between individual entities and the related political groups they form. From this, a topological
mapping can be inferred that relates political ideology, central bank perception, and monetary
policy ideology. The underlying aim is to start the process of examining if there are underlying
structures to these political entities that can be used to predict central bank ideological
tendencies, and to examine if there are broader ramifications to these underlying structures.
This paper will use the policy stances of political actors with a strong focus on using
modern quantitative easing as a case study in order to gain insight into the broader central
bank legitimacy philosophies of the political actors in this study. Though quantitative easing is a
focus, general monetary policy positions and central bank philosophies will be explored. The
reasoning behind this specific case study is that the rhetoric surrounding quantitative easing
definitively involves discussion of the limits of central bank authority because quantitative
easing policy has never been used in the modern manner before. This forces the conversation
about the limits of central bank authority into a conversation about the legitimacy of the
resulting policy, because the underlying authority of an institution fundamentally dictates the
legitimacy of the policies that the institution creates and executes. So, by analyzing the policy
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stances of different political actors with regards to quantitative easing and monetary policy, we
can infer what these actors believe to be the limits of authority in the central banks themselves.
From this a typology of sorts can be constructed and related to more traditional political
spectrums. This typology can be used in new research by comparing ideological positions of
various political ‘types’ across a domain of different topics, and deriving underlying theories to
explain the foundations of a ‘types’ political philosophy. For example, do conservatives tend to
view central bank authority through a certain lens, and does this relate to how they view other
institutions such as the courts? Are libertarians consistent with certain stances with regards to
centralized authority? This paper aims to provide some sort of framework from which questions
of this nature can be explored.
This paper will be broken into several sections with the goal being to build a general
sense of the ideological environment surrounding central banking and monetary policy
positions with respect to the political spectrum. A brief background will be covered, where the
history of central banking, with an emphasis on North America, will be discussed. The
background will also cover the philosophy of institutional legitimacy with respect to central
banks, in the context of the broader sociopolitical environment, and will touch on how modern
quantitative easing has shaken the traditional notions of central bank legitimacy. Following the
background section, qualitative data will be presented that corresponds to the policy positions
of the various political actors across the political spectrum. The aim of this section will be to
present direct quotes and statements from the political actors, organized according to where
the actor rests on the political spectrum. General discussion and analysis will be presented as
the data is presented. The next section will be an analysis of the case study, modern
quantitative easing, in the context of the data that has been presented. An overall macro
analysis will be presented that summarizes the main observations resulting from the data set.
The last section will be a general discussion of some of the theory behind the construction of
the left-right spectrum, as well as the moral and philosophical underpinnings of the behavioral
and policy differences that we see between political actors. The goal of this section is to provide
a framework from which this project can be extended, in analyzing how the current literature
interacts with the data in this project.
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Background
The Federal Reserve of the United States was created through an act of Congress in
1913 and is the central bank of the United States1. The creation of this central bank came as a
response to the drastic financial turmoil of the early 1900’s, in which both consumer level and
institutional confidence in the American financial system was at historic lows. Liquidity issues
had plagued traditional banks in the decades leading up to the legislation, and low consumer
confidence had created an environment where economic growth was stifled. The Federal
Reserve’s original mandate was to help stabilize the American financial system through the use
of controlling the money supply and dictating the terms by which American banks operated.
Some examples of this control are the dictating of the primary dealer reserve requirements, the
dictating of interest rates on reserve holdings, and setting the interest rates on short and long
term lending directly to the primary dealers. The Federal Reserve was to be governed by a
board of governors that would be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate and
would act without the direct direction of Congress or the Executive brach.
The Bank of Canada was created by an act of Parliament in 1934 with the purpose being
"to regulate credit and currency in the best interests of the economic life of the nation, to
control and protect the external value of the national monetary unit and to mitigate by its
influence fluctuations in the general level of production, trade, prices and employment, so far
as may be possible within the scope of monetary action, and generally to promote the
economic and financial welfare of the Dominion"2. The Bank of Canada is legally a crown
corporation under the control of the Minister of Finance, as opposed to a government agency.
This was thought to better insulate monetary policy from partisan politics. The Bank of Canada
has a board of directors that the Minister of Finance appoints for three-year terms, and they in
turn appoint the governor who, with the approval of the Cabinet, serves a seven year term.
The original mandate of the Federal Reserve was two-fold, to maximize employment
and control inflationary forces. The limit that the Federal Reserve had with regards to its

1
2

The Federal Reserve Act. 1914.
Bank of Canada Act. 1934.
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actionable policy was confinement to domestic monetary policy, with international policy being
the responsibility of the Treasury department. Since the implementation of the Bretton Woods
system in the post World War 2 era, the Federal Reserve has been forbidden from acting with
international intent, whether it be through currency markets, monetary policy, or anything
else3. Though the intent of these restrictions was to separate the two monetary domains,
domestic and international, crossover effects are common. Some Federal Reserve actions have
international impacts, such as in the bond markets or foreign exchange markets 4. Due to this
interconnectedness, the Federal Reserve’s policy scope lives in a legal grey area. The normative
understanding is that the intent of the policy is the primary determinant of the legitimacy of
such policy, where an international or domestic intent is required for assessment5.
Since intent is a primary factor in determining the legitimacy of a Federal Reserve policy,
the narrative construction surrounding the policy is crucial for persuading Congress and other
institutional actors of the policy’s legitimacy. Problems in the consistency of a narrative over
time can have drastic impacts on the institutional trust that the public and other political actors
have in the Federal Reserve. For instance, the narrative surrounding the Federal Reserve’s use
of monetary intervention started exclusively with the lending market prior to 2008, then shifted
to a self-proclaimed emergency measure in 2008, and shifted again to a market aid in 2010 and
2012. This gradual expansion in monetary policy use continued in 2020 when the Federal
Reserve announced that it would be performing another round of quantitative easing, where
there would be no limits on asset purchases, and assets held internationally would be targeted
alongside domestic ones6.

3

Ronkainen, Antti, and Ville-Pekka Sorsa. "Quantitative Easing forever? Financialisation and the institutional
legitimacy of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy." New political economy 23, no. 6 (2018): 711727
4
Blinder, Alan S. "Quantitative easing: entrance and exit strategies." Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 92,
no. 6 (2010): 465-479.
5
Ronkainen, Antti, and Ville-Pekka Sorsa. "Quantitative Easing forever? Financialisation and the institutional
legitimacy of the Federal Reserve’s unconventional monetary policy." New political economy 23, no. 6 (2018): 711727
6
FED, 2020. Press Release. Federal Reserve announces establishment of a temporary FIMA Repo Facility to help
support the smooth functioning of financial markets, Online: The Federal Reserve.
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The inconsistent narrative surrounding the use of liquidity generating measures puts the
actual mandate and scope of power of the Federal Reserve into question, as the limits on
authority seem to sway and move through time. Some flexibility and ambiguity are essential in
any large political institution, as circumstances on the ground often move much faster than
society can change law or social norms. Benjamin Braun argues that,
The driving force behind this co-evolution of money, banking, and central
banking is the need to strike an – only ever temporary – balance between elasticity and
trust. On the one hand, more abstract and elastic forms of money bring efficiency gains
in the form of lower transaction costs and greater policy flexibility. On the other hand,
the fiduciary character of abstract forms of money requires increasingly sophisticated
institutional arrangements to inspire sufficient social trust and confidence7
It is generally accepted that a balance must be struck between having vaguely defined
and having well defined operational parameters, with the aim to maximize the functionality of
the institution while maintaining enough institutional legitimacy to perpetuate the institutions
existence. In the case of the Federal Reserve, the bounds of its policy reach have drastically
expanded several times in a relatively short amount of historical time. Several times in the last
two decades the Federal Reserve implemented new monetary policy with varying public
justification, which may cause political conflict with other political actors, whose opinion and
perceptions are essential for the survival of the institution8. The phenomena of the expansion
of central bank policy is not confined to the United States, the European Central Bank and the
Bank of Japan have both conducted expansive quantitative easing programs in which the
European Central Bank has targeted US dollar liquidity9 and the Bank of Japan has targeted

7

Braun, Benjamin. "Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative
easing." Review of International Political Economy 23, no. 6 (2016): 1064-1092
8
Ibid.
9
ECB, 2020. Press Release. Coordinated central bank action to further enhance the provision of US dollar liquidity,
Frankfurt: European Central Bank
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liquidity markets in Canadian dollars, US dollars, and the Pound Sterling10 11 12. The Bank of
Canada has, for the first time in history, implemented a QE program for 2020, and in addition
has targeted international assets in the form of US treasuries13. With the expansion of the asset
classes that central banks will add to their balance sheets, and with the growing use of QE
programs in more monetarily traditional places like Canada, it is evident that central banks may
fundamentally shift their ability to interact with the global economic system and may change
their institutional role in the eyes of the public and other political actors.

Ideological Approaches To Central Banking And Monetary Policy
The Progressive Approach
The Democratic party is the left end of American politics, but it encompasses a broad
range of political ideologies, and their positions on central banking and monetary policy reflect
this clearly. Bernie Sanders has been quite outspoken about the Federal Reserve’s role in the
wealth and earnings disparities between what he calls ‘ordinary Americans’ and the ‘billionaires
on Wall Street’14. This is directly addressed on his campaign website where he states that there
is a need to “Audit the Federal Reserve and make it a more democratic institution so that it
becomes responsive to the needs of ordinary Americans, not just the billionaires on Wall
Street.”15. In 2019 Sanders wrote an article for CNN in which he discussed the differences
between the Federal Reserve’s interest rates and the interest rates that credit card companies

10

BOJ. 2020. Press Release. Canadian Dollar Funds-Supplying Operations against Pooled Collateral. Tokyo: Bank of
Japan
11

BOJ, 2020. Press Release. Pound Sterling Funds-Supplying Operations against Pooled Collateral, Tokyo: Bank of
Japan
12

BOJ, 2020. Press Release. U.S. Dollar Funds-Supplying Operations against Pooled Collateral (Re-established on
May 10, 2010), Tokyo: Bank of Japan
13

BOC. 2020. Press Release. Bank of Canada maintains overnight rate target and unveils new market operations.
Ottawa: The Bank of Canada.
14
15

Bernie Sanders Campaign Website. https://berniesanders.com/issues/real-wall-street-reform/
Ibid.
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charged their clients16. Sanders stated that “Despite the fact that banks can borrow money
from the Fed at less than 2.5%, the median credit card interest rate — which is the rate most
new cardholders receive — is now over 21%. Last year, Wall Street banks made $113 billion in
credit card interest alone, up by nearly 50% in just five years, and accelerating, according to an
analysis of FDIC data. In other words, while working class Americans pay outrageously high
interest rates, Wall Street banks get rich.”17. His focus is clearly centered on what he views as
the ‘ordinary American’ and sees the Federal Reserve as a potential mechanism for harming the
people and benefiting the economic elites. This fits nicely into the populist ideological
structure, where the people are being economically hindered by the elites who are controlling
the structure that determines this economic dynamic.
According to an article by The Street in 201918 Sanders was the only person running for
the Democratic presidential nomination that criticized the Federal Reserve for increasing
interest rates from 2015 to 2018. Sanders claimed that “Raising rates should be done as a last
resort, not to fight phantom inflation”, because he views high interest rates as contributing to
the suppression of the people. In a 2015 Op-Ed for The New York Times, Sanders advocated for
low interest rates in conjunction with allowing for the Federal Reserve to lend to small
businesses and consumers directly, as opposed to only lending to the primary dealer banks who
then provide commercial lending to the broader public19. Sanders also stated that “[…] as a
condition of receiving financial assistance from the Fed, large banks must commit to increasing
lending to creditworthy small businesses and consumers, reducing credit card interest rates and
fees, and providing help to underwater and struggling homeowners.”20. Sanders also advocated
for negative interest on deposits for the primary dealers, where he wants the interest profit

16

Bernie Sanders. : https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/17/perspectives/bernie-sanders-loan-shark-preventionact/index.html
17
Ibid.
18
Lenihan, Ben. Published online November 19, 2019. https://www.thestreet.com/investing/sanders-onlydemocratic-candidate-to-criticize-the-fed-on-interest-rates-15171876
19
Sanders, Bernie. Op-Ed for The New York Times. Published online December 23, 2015.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/opinion/bernie-sanders-to-rein-in-wall-street-fix-the-fed.html
20
Ibid.
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that is gained by the Federal Reserve to be dispersed in social programs or as loans to smaller
borrowers21. Sanders stated
The Fed must also make sure that financial institutions are investing in the
productive economy by providing affordable loans to small businesses and consumers
that create good jobs. How? First, we should prohibit commercial banks from gambling
with the bank deposits of the American people. Second, the Fed must stop providing
incentives for banks to keep money out of the economy. Since 2008, the Fed has been
paying financial institutions interest on excess reserves parked at the central bank —
reserves that have grown to an unprecedented $2.4 trillion. That is insane. Instead of
paying banks interest on these reserves, the Fed should charge them a fee that would
be used to provide direct loans to small businesses.22
Sanders also commented on the governance structure of the institution as well, stating that
If I were elected president, the foxes would no longer guard the henhouse. To
ensure the safety and soundness of our banking system, we need to fundamentally
restructure the Fed’s governance system to eliminate conflicts of interest. Board
members should be nominated by the president and chosen by the Senate. Banking
industry executives must no longer be allowed to serve on the Fed’s boards and to
handpick its members and staff. Board positions should instead include representatives
from all walks of life — including labor, consumers, homeowners, urban residents,
farmers and small businesses.23
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is another prominent leftist figure that mirrors the economic
populist type of perspective with regards to the Federal Reserve. Ocasio-Cortez was reported
by Business Insider as stating that the amount of money that was introduced into the system by
the Federal Reserve through the primary dealers was similar in scale to the amount of
outstanding student loan debt in the entire United States24. This was echoed by Sanders in the
same article, both politicians were advocating for the use of the Federal Reserve to be used in a
manner that acted to distribute liquidity to their version of ‘the regular people’ and have the
taxation base fill the debt void over time. A Twitter tweet directly from Ocasio-Cortez’s official
Twitter account mirrors the articles sentiment, it reads “FYI, the amount that the Fed just

21

Ibid.
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Mohamed, Theron. Published online March 13, 2020. https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/aocbernie-sanders-blast-fed-1-5-trillion-calm-bankers-2020-3-1028993468#
22
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injected almost covers all student loan debt in the US”25. The ideological position of both
Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez with respect to the legal and political role of the Federal Reserve’s
monetary policy is in stark contrast to the original institutional objectives as set out earlier in
the paper. It seems that these actors place a significant amount of the institutional legitimacy of
the Federal Reserve on how it interacts directly with ‘ordinary Americans’. Perhaps they view its
role in a democratic manner where the masses have more direct control over the nation’s
monetary policy. The same Business Insider article quotes Ocasio-Cortez as saying “There is
absolutely NO excuse for not pausing student debt collections, planning for mortgage & rent
relief, etc,". "We need to care for working people as much as we care for the stock market.”26.
Sanders is also quoted on his official 2019 presidential campaign website mirroring the
same democratic shift in institutional legitimacy as Ocasio-Cortez, “Audit the Federal Reserve
and make it a more democratic institution so that it becomes responsive to the needs of
ordinary Americans, not just the billionaires on Wall Street”27. Further adding to the sentiment
that the progressive branch of the Democratic party has fundamental and institutional
philosophical differences in the function and mandate of central bank policy, a 2019 CNN article
reported on a committee discourse between Ocasio-Cortez and the Federal Reserve Chairman
Jerome Powell. The CNN article highlights an important takeaway from the dialogue, which was
a comment made by National Economic Council director Larry Kudlow afterwards to FOX News
in praise of Ocasio-Cortez’s understanding of the Phillips Curve, and the article highlights
“While Kudlow and Ocasio-Cortez may agree on the Phillips Curve, they disagree in other areas
of economic policy, such as the government's role in helping the poor, raising the minimum
wage, as well as her support for the Green New Deal, which she says would be a boon for jobs
and the Trump administration says would be economically unfeasible”28. This further supports

25

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez official Twitter account. Tweet posted on March 12, 2020.
Mohamed, Theron. Published online March 13, 2020. https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/aocbernie-sanders-blast-fed-1-5-trillion-calm-bankers-2020-3-1028993468#
26

27

Bernie Sanders Campaign Website. https://berniesanders.com/issues/real-wall-street-reform/
Vazquez, Maegan. Published online July 11, 2019. https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/11/politics/alexandria-ocasiocortez-larry-kudlow-phillips-curve/index.html
28
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the philosophical position of Ocasio-Cortez with respect to the Federal Reserve’s mandate and
scope.
Elizabeth Warren is often viewed as a far-left political figure in public discourse, but her
position on the spectrum is not straight forward when analysing her policies. In contrast to
Sanders, Warren voted in congress against an external audit of the Federal Reserve, claiming
that the oversight the Federal Reserve already has is sufficient29. Warrens concerns with the
central bank shift away from the object that is the ordinary people, towards more
institutionalised entities such as unions and business structures. In a report by Reuters, Warren
was quoted as saying that the current monetary policy did not do enough for the unions, and
she also mentioned that American families and workers should have benefitted more from the
policies30. The article quotes her as saying “The Federal Reserve is handing out billions of dollars
with little oversight and failing to require basic protections that companies retain workers and
maintain payroll, failing to include protections against outsourcing, and failing to retain basic
protections for union workers, […] Absent these protections, it is not clear how these bailouts
will help American families and workers.”31.
In a speech that Warren gave on the Senate floor during the confirmation hearing of
Jerome Powel, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, she said that she was concerned that
Powel would weaken financial regulations and not tighten them32. She opposed Powel’s
nomination on these grounds because she viewed weaker regulations as being beneficial to the
financial institutions at the expense of the rest of society. Warren’s perspective is quite focused
on the regulatory nature of the central banking institution and the macro effects on labour
unions, financial institutions, and families/communities. This is more in line with accepting the
Federal Reserve’s legal mandate to a greater extent than the more populist left, who seem to
reject the mandate wholly. There are blurry lines between the two, as line are often blurry in

29

Warren. https://www.isidewith.com/candidates/elizabeth-warren/policies/economic/federal-reserve
Schroeder, Pete. Published online April 16, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-fedwarren/senator-warren-takes-treasury-fed-to-task-over-little-oversight-of-stimulus-programs-idUSKBN21Y32V
31
Ibid.
32
Warren, Elizabeth. Official Senate website. https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senatorwarren-delivers-floor-speech-against-jerome-powell-nomination-for-federal-reserve-chair
30
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political science, but I think that a distinction is clear in the implied philosophical positions.
Warren’s official Senate website highlights this with directly addressing the issue of Powell’s
nomination,
United States Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) today delivered a speech on the
Senate floor on the nomination of Jerome Powell to serve as Chairman of the Federal
Reserve. In her speech, Senator Warren expressed concern that Mr. Powell would
weaken financial regulations rather than strengthen them, and urged her colleagues to
reject his nomination.33
While big banks have bounced back from the 2008 financial crisis and are posting record
profits, many American families are still trying to rebuild their lives ten years later. Yet
Governor Powell seems to think that the number one problem with our current financial
system is that we're too hard on the banks. In his confirmation hearing he said he
would, quote, "continue to consider appropriate ways to ease regulatory
burdens." When I asked him if there was a single financial rule he thought should be
stronger - just a single provision in one of the Fed's dozens of rules where there might
be an unintended loophole or where an innovative product has introduced a new risk
into the system - he couldn't name a single one-not one.34
The Brookings Institute is a left leaning think tank that has published several online
articles and opinion pieces on current Federal Reserve and Treasury Department policy. A
notable piece was written in support of the CARES Act, a bill passed by Congress that allowed
for the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department to make certain loans directly to small
and mid-sized business, in response to economic circumstances affiliated with the Covid-19
pandemic. The article highlights the ‘Main Street Lending Program’ aka MSLP, “authorized by
the CARES Act, provides loans to small and mid-size firms and large below-investment-grade
firms that were financially sound before the onset of the pandemic. Extending credit can help
some of these businesses manage the near-term drop in revenues, prevent unnecessary
failures, and so support a recovery once the pandemic eases. The MSLP is a big step for the
Federal Reserve and Treasury, given the risk of these loans and the legal constraints on Fed
lending.”35. This type of program is relatively in line with the general progressive idea of
expanding the legal mandate of the Federal Reserve, in this case to work more directly with
33

Ibid.
Ibid.
35
English, William. Liang, Nellie. Published online June 18, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/research/designingthe-main-street-lending-program-challenges-and-options/
34
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smaller businesses instead of mostly through the primary dealers that traditionally courted the
Federal Reserves’ focus.
In an article dated in March 2020, Nellie Liang who co-authored the above article on the
CARES Act, wrote an opinion piece that advocated for the Federal Reserve to clarify its legal
stance on how banks can deal with their clients with respect to lending and asset management.
This comes as the US government was rapidly expanding the money supply through treasury
purchases with the aim to inject liquidity into the market. The issue that Liang highlighted was
that the movement of capital through traditional channels was quite constrained and slow, and
suggested that the Federal Reserve take a look at non-normative legal options that it could
explore. Further, Liang subtly suggests a possible scenario where the Federal Reserve can buy
what would be deemed ‘junk bonds’ on the open market, in an attempt to relieve liquidity
stress on businesses. In essence this would mean that the Federal Reserve would bail out bad
bond debt, as well as be able to buy future bonds from sub-par businesses, which would be an
indirect bailout. Clearly this is outside of the traditional privy of the Federal Reserve’s mandate,
as the 2008 bailouts required Congressional approval, but Liang’s suggestion is more focused on
bond debt as opposed to the 2008 focus which was a wider basket of distressed assets.
Relaxing buffers or even changing rules temporarily will not resolve the current
public health crisis nor compensate for the losses in asset prices. Indeed, the large
draws by corporations on their committed lines and letters of credit will strain bank
balance sheets. Some of that was anticipated in the supervisory stress tests. For many
years, those tests have assumed a global recession with severe stresses in the corporate
sector. But corporate draws on credit lines are producing additional exposure to
business customers on bank balance sheets, so they are not likely to want to absorb
more corporate bonds in their inventories. If authorities think there is a need to stem
the fall in bond prices and possible fire sales, responses by fiscal authorities or
traditional buyers of corporate bonds would be a better way to reduce systemic risks. 36
The Communist Party USA has not made any official public statements regarding central
banking or monetary policy.

36

Liang, Nellie. Published online March 20, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/03/20/the-fedshould-clarify-how-banks-can-deploy-capital-and-liquidity/
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The Center-Left Approach
This transitions into what is considered the more moderate left, or center left. In a
similar fashion to Warren, Chuck Schumer is an advocate for using the Federal Reserve in a
more commercial capacity, where in a Reuters article he wanted the Federal Reserve to look
into providing direct low interest loans to non-profit organizations and local governments37.
The article stated
U.S. Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer said he had urged Federal Reserve
Chairman Jerome Powell in a phone call on Monday to open Fed’s Main Street Lending
program to nonprofits and local governments. In a statement, Schumer said Powell
“indicated to me that the Fed is actively working on solutions, and nonprofits will very
likely be included.” Schumer also said Powell “assured me that the Fed was similarly
working to make the program directly accessible to more cities and counties.”38
Like Warren, Schumer is quite distinct with respect to the populist left (progressive left)
in that his main concerns are organizational bodies or institutions, as opposed to specific group
of individuals. Though Schumer and Warren are often seen as distinctly separated on the leftright spectrum, it seems that the basis for their central bank and monetary policy advocacies
are relatively aligned.
This leads us into another distinct group of the Democratic party, and that is the camp
of Joe Biden and Cory Booker. In a National Review article, Biden is quoted as saying that “[…]
he wants to add to the Federal Reserve’s mission: It should promote economic equality among
races as well as low inflation and unemployment”39. In conjunction, Booker made a statement
on his 2019 campaign website saying that he “[…] urged the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
to more closely examine how racial disparities affect the student debt crisis.”40. Booker has a

37

Reuters staff. Published online April 20, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usaschumer/schumer-urges-feds-powell-to-open-loan-programs-to-nonprofits-local-governments-idUSKBN2222XP
38

Ibid.

39

Ponnuru, Ramesh. Published online July 31, 2020. https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/the-fed-and-racialequality/
40

Booker, Cory. Official Senate website. https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/booker-calls-on-ny-fed-toassess-racial-disparities-in-student-loan-borrowers
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very pronounced and descriptive position on this matter, and his website elaborates on the
positions in the following sections,
U.S. Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) today urged the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York to more closely examine how racial disparities affect the student debt crisis. The
letter comes as Congress considers student loan legislation as part of the
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. […].The current student loan system leaves
borrowers of color stuck with disproportionally higher debt than their white
counterparts. In the current higher education system, African American and Latino
students face more challenges, have fewer resources, and are burdened with more debt
when pursuing a degree.41
African American college graduates owe $7,400 more in debt on average than
their white peers when they receive a bachelor’s degree. This alarming difference is a
crippling weight on the shoulders of borrowers of color, who are less likely to be able to
afford a higher education42
Evidence suggests the effects of these racial disparities may be particularly
pronounced in America’s largest metropolitan areas, which continue to suffer from the
effects of decades of segregation and racial inequality. This issue is further compounded
by the fact that persistent discrimination against African Americans has hindered their
opportunities to obtain quality employment and begin a career.43
Booker has been a forceful advocate for easing the financial burden students
face when obtaining a college degree, especially low-income students and students of
color. In the Senate he has introduced a number of bills to expand the affordability and
accessibility of a college degree, including bills to simplify the FAFSA form, make it easier
to refinance student loans, and make college debt-free.44
These statements from both Biden and Booker are actually in ideological opposition the
populist lefts Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez. Where Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez advocated for using
the Federal Reserve as a state tool to benefit the majority group of ‘ordinary Americans’, Biden
and Booker directly advocate for using the Federal Reserve to benefit specific minority groups,
in this case racial groups. In addition, Biden does not reject the current and historic legal and
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institutional legitimacy of the Federal Reserve, but aims to expand it’s scope of mandate to
include promoting “[…] economic equality among races […]”45.
An interesting note is Bidens pick for the Treasury Secretary cabinet position. Biden
nominated Janet Yellen for the position shortly after his presidential inauguration. Yellen was a
former Federal Reserve Chairman, under Presidents Obama and Trump, as well as an economic
advisor to President Clinton. The Financial Post reported on Yellen’s advisory relationship with
then candidate Biden several month prior to the 2020 presidential election. The article states
In testimony to the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis last
month, Yellen advocated for Congress to do more to support the economy. She told the
subcommittee that it would be a “catastrophe” if lawmakers decided not to continue
enhanced unemployment insurance that expired July 31. “We need the spending that
those unemployed workers can do,” she said. Yellen, who is now at the Brookings
Institution in Washington, said the program could be restructured to cap total insurance
payments at a fixed percentage of regular income. Along with former Fed chair Ben
Bernanke, she also called for more action on the fiscal front, including aid to state and
local governments — which has been a point of contention between Republicans and
Democrats now in a standstill over an additional stimulus package.46
The connection that Yellen has with the Brookings Institute and the joint positions of
Yellen and Biden reflect the overall leftist position of using the Federal Reserve as a broad
socio-economic tool, as opposed to a narrowly tailed tool.
A figure such as Joe Manchin is often considered a red Democrat, having his Senate seat
in the state of West Virginia, and he has only ever advocated for Federal Reserve governors
“[…] who aren’t wall Street insiders […]”, in a Wall Streel Journal article he co-wrote with
Warren in 201447. The article further mentions that both authors support more government
oversight on the financial sector.
Lax supervision isn’t an abstract or academic problem. The stakes couldn’t be
higher. Just this summer, the Fed and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. determined
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that 11 of the country’s biggest banks had no credible plan for being resolved in
bankruptcy. That means that if any one of these banks makes more wild bets and loses,
the taxpayers would have to bail it out to prevent the economy from crashing again.
We’re all counting on the Fed to monitor the big banks and stop them from taking on
too much risk, but evidence is mounting that this faith in the Fed is misplaced. 48
The NDP is widely considered as the predominant left or far-left party in Canada, with
the Green party being considered a very minor political player but still left of center, by both
the policy based and self-identifying based classification methods. The first thing to note is that
the NDP did not mention central banking, monetary policy, or quantitative easing in their party
manifestoes from 2019 till 2011. The only time the Bank of Canada is ever mentioned is in using
some statistics to provide context for some economic projection49. The Green party however
has mentioned in both its 2015 and 2019 manifestos that they would “Review the economic
and fiscal implications of returning to borrowing from the Bank of Canada”50, in the context of
reviewing the role of the Bank of Canada in the broader context of government borrowing and
interest rates. The Green party was advocating at the time that government spending should be
increased and that since the Bank of Canada is a government agent, it could be used to help
facilitate a larger fiscal deficit through lower interest rates. The NDP is also a strong advocate
for larger fiscal positions but does not directly advocate for a heavy role of the central bank.
Perhaps the NDP views direct fiscal policy as the solution to what they view as a budgetary
problem, and from this advocates for increased taxation. These differences between the
manifesto positions of the two most left Canadian parties seems arbitrary but could also be an
indication of drastically different ideological positions with respect to the role of a central bank
in society. There is not much information from which a deep analytical dive can be conducted in
the Canadian context. Although there are populist types who are members of both the NDP and
the Green party, the party as a whole does not seem to advocate for populist positions with
respect to monetary policy in their manifestos. The Liberal party of Canada is also considered a
more moderate leftist party, but they have no party platform elements that directly address
central banking from 2011 till 2019.
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The Conservative and Libertarian Approach
The mainstream conservative position and the more libertarian positions can be viewed
as quite distinct at their extremes, but fall nicely on the continuum that this paper has started
to construct. This is evident in that the more center-conservatives view the central banks as an
extension of the government, in a similar fashion to the center-liberals. But the more libertarian
conservatives view the central banks as an agency that should act more independently from the
broader government structure, as well as have a very narrow scope of mandate.
An example of a mainstream conservative is Ted Cruz. Cruz has a position with respect
to the scope of the Federal Reserve that is quite similar to Warren and Schumer. Cruz wrote a
letter to the Treasury Secretary and to the Federal Reserve Chairman in April of 2020 that
advocated for extending capital assistance and special lending programs to the oil and gas
industry in response to the Covid induced circumstances. Cruz used the language of the Federal
Reserve Act to justify his position in asking for a special lending program to be set up with the
aim being to support small and medium sized businesses.51
Under the authority of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal
Reserve, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, should immediately create
a new lending facility that will provide emergency liquidity for small-and-medium sized
businesses that work directly or indirectly with the oil and gas industry. Without any
such assistance the United States risks the loss of hundreds of thousands of Americans
jobs and irreparable damage to our domestic energy infrastructure.52
The emphasis of Cruz’s letter is on the oil and gas industry, which is an integral part of
the Texas economy, where he is a sitting Senator. Cruz acknowledges that the CARES Act was
within his philosophical and legal understandings because he praised it in the letter. But Cruz
also claimed that the restrictions laid out in the CARES Act were detrimental to specific
industries, including oil and gas. By advocating for the expansion of the scope of the emergency
lending programs in this particular manner, Cruz fundamentally aligns himself with some of the
moderate liberals in terms of their underlying philosophy of central bank legitimacy. A
distinction that seems present though is that Cruz uses the language of the legislation that gives
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the Federal Reserve its authority and mandate to justify his position, where Warren and
Schumer use a more social argument to justify their positions. Perhaps this is a minor
distinction, but it may be indicative of deeper philosophical differences.
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act directed the
Federal Reserve to provide immediate liquidity for small- and medium-sized businesses
through the creation of the Main Street Lending Program (MSLP). I would like to
commend the Federal Reserve for expeditiously creating both the Main Street New Loan
Facility (MSNLF) and the Main Street Expanded Loan Facility (MSELF). Unfortunately,
these programs are not sufficiently structured to support the urgent needs of
companies who engage in or support oil exploration, production, transport, storage, and
refining activities. For example, the MSNLF and MSELF both prohibit eligible borrowers,
in this case oil and gas companies, from using loans to refinance pre-existing debt, and
they place restrictions on the size of loans for businesses with large amounts of debt.
Because of these restrictions, small- and medium-sized oil and gas companies, who
desperately need liquidity because of massive demand disruption caused by COVID-19
and foreign oil aggressive overproduction and price discounts, are unable to access the
short-term liquidity they need to avoid bankruptcy.53
Sarah Palin is generally considered a more mainstream conservative voice, but also has
some populist tendencies, but for the sake of this paper she will be included in this section.
Palin has been relatively absent from politics in the last few years, but she has made statements
regarding central banking and quantitative easing policy in the past. Most notably she took a
hard stance against the bond buying programs of the 2009-2010 time period, stating that she
had deep concerns regarding the fallout of the program. As noted in a Wall Street Journal
article from 2010,
Sarah Palin, delving into a major policy issue a week after the mid-term
elections, took aim Monday at the Federal Reserve and called on Fed chairman Ben
Bernanke to "cease and desist" with a bond-buying program designed to boost the
economy. [..]. Speaking at a trade association conference in Phoenix, the potential 2012
presidential candidate and tea-party favorite said she's "deeply concerned" about the
central bank creating new money to buy government bonds. Ms. Palin said "it's far from
certain this will even work" and suggested the move would create an inflation
problem.54
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The issue of the causal relationship between Federal Reserve programs and inflation is
contested in the literature, and different programs seem to effect inflationary factors in
different manners. It is clear though that Palin and Cruz are quite different in their stances on
Federal Reserve policy, but it is important to note that the circumstances and time period of the
statements are quite distinct.
Rand Paul is considered a conservative figure with libertarian leanings on specific issues.
Paul has routinely commented on his position regarding general transparency with regards to
the Federal Reserve’s internal processes as well as the justification of policy positions. Per an
announcement made on Paul’s official Senate website, Paul introduced legislation in 2019 to
attempt to provide some public transparency through an ‘auditing’ mechanism. The text from
the announcement is below.
Earlier this month, U.S. Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) reintroduced his Federal
Reserve Transparency Act (S. 148), widely known as the “Audit the Fed” bill, to prevent
the Federal Reserve from concealing vital information on its operations from Congress.
Seven cosponsors joined Senator Paul on the legislation. “Audit the Fed is a grassrootsdriven movement that has rattled the establishment and proven time and again the
difference concerned Americans can make against the odds. It’s time for Congress to
respond by passing this bill to hold the secretive Federal Reserve, the enabler of
Washington’s spending addiction, accountable to the people’s representatives,”. 55
This is an interesting proposal because of the nature of how the oversight of the
institution of the Federal Reserve is constructed. The Federal Reserve is supposed to be
independent of both the executive and legislative branches of government, able to pursue its
mandate as written in law. Changing the oversight ability of both the executive, through
legislative authority, and the legislative, through changing of the Federal Reserve’s mandate via
legislation, would fundamentally shift the paradigm of monetary policy. The politicalphilosophical underpinnings that support the idea of central bank independence are being
questioned in this proposal. This is subtly unique in its structure, where Paul does not
reject/impose institutional legitimacy based on norms, and also does not take an approach to
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alter the norms through the means that some other political figures have. Instead it is a
straightforward legislative goal, and a clearly defined objective.
In conjunction with the 2019 legislation that Paul introduced aimed at central banking
transparency, in 2020 Paul also introduced legislation that aimed to limit the Federal Reserve’s
ability to influence government bodies. This is a contentious topic because of the commonness
of close personal, business, and historical relationships between members of the Federal
Reserve, government agencies such as the Treasury Department, and private financial actors
such as banks and equity funds. It is normal for economists to move through various jobs in the
public and private sector, bouncing between various employers. This inevitably leads to many
conflicts of interest, of which corruption and breach of public trust may result. The goal of
Paul’s legislation is detailed below.
U.S. Senator Rand Paul today announced plans to introduce legislation that
would ban the Federal Reserve (Fed), and all of its personnel, from lobbying Congress
and the American people against legislation to bring transparency to the Fed or other
matters. The legislation, known as the Bring Accountability Now to the Fed Act,
prohibits anyone acting on behalf of the Fed from actively supporting or opposing
legislation before Congress. “The Fed has used its immense power to bailout Wall Street
and print money to finance our debt. When anyone rises up to challenge them, Fed
officials use taxpayer dollars to lobby for more power and against oversight of their
activities. It is time for Congress and the American people to say enough is enough,”
Sen. Paul said.56
Paul’s sentiment is not new, as indicated in his article for Time magazine in 2016, where
he discusses, at length, his view that the Federal Reserve is operating far outside of it’s
constitutional bounds, and has been/is being used as a political tool to the detriment of the
public.
The Fed was intended to be an apolitical body, a concession to placate the
naysayers. But today, the Fed isn’t even shy about entering the political fray: witness
Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen’s income inequality speech riddled with Democratic
talking points during the 2014 elections. The Fed is, indeed, a political, oligarchic force,
and a key part of what looks and functions like a banking cartel. During the 2007-08
financial crisis, the Fed’s true nature was clear to anyone paying attention. As the
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Treasury began bailing out the investment banks from the consequences of their
profligate risk-taking (and in some cases fraudulent schemes), the Fed moved in
tandem, further purchasing the underwater assets of these institutions, as well as
actually paying interest to the commercial banks (hemorrhaging from risky loans) for
reserves they kept parked at the Fed. To be sure, Fed officials came up with opaque
jargon to describe such operations, but the stark reality is that the Fed was treating risky
assets as good collateral, and in the fall of 2008 began literally paying banks to not make
loans to their customers.57
Jo Jorgenson was the presidential nominee for the Libertarian Party during the 2020
presidential election. In a 2020 interview with Bitcoin.com, Jorgenson made several statements
regarding the Federal Reserve and its monetary policy, specifically in the context of the policy
stemming from the Covid pandemic. The policy position, both philosophical and political, of
both Jorgenson and the Libertarian Party was discussed in depth. Jorgenson made many
statements over the long interview, the most important ones for this paper are below.
First all the Federal Reserve should have never been created to begin with.
Unfortunately, they are teaching history a little wrong in the textbooks these days.
Because a lot of people say that if it wasn’t for the Fed stepping in, the Great Depression
would have been so much worse. But actually the Federal Reserve caused the problems.
The reason the Fed was brought about was to help with times of crisis — to smooth
things over. But the tragedy is that the banks had already worked out a system already.
A system of where the banks helped each other out voluntarily and it did not involve the
ups and downs of the Fed. So first of all, it should have never been created. Second, it
took a small problem and made it much larger. And third, the first thing I would do if I
was President of the United States would be to audit the Federal Reserve. I would seek
advice from former Senator Ron Paul and ask him his recommendation on who should
be in charge of that investigation committee. Eventually, I’d like to see the Fed
abolished. Because through the Federal Reserve we get money created out of thin air,
which is basically the equivalent of counterfeit money.58
A message from the Libertarian Party platform says: “We favor free-market
banking with unrestricted competition among banks and depository institutions of all
types — Individuals engaged in voluntary exchange should be free to use as money any
mutually agreeable commodity or item. We support a halt to inflationary monetary
policies and unconstitutional legal tender laws.”59
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So a number of people say that they want to back USD with gold. That would be
a step in the right direction, but that is not enough. We have competition in cars,
competition with computers, and competitive grocery stores. Why not have competition
with money? So the people have access to something that is more planned and a
monetary system they can better predict. Right now what we have is money that’s
created under the whims of Congress and the Federal Reserve Chair.60
I would act in support of a free market in currencies. Some people say that the
constitution authorizes the federal government to create currency, just like it authorizes
the creation of the post office. But in neither case, does the constitution give the federal
government a monopoly on currency or the delivery of mail. Businesses should be able
to trade and accept whatever they want and that would mean bitcoin and all the other
cryptocurrencies.”61
The official American libertarian line seems to be in dismantling the Federal Reserve in
favor of a competitive system of banks and currencies. This falls in line with the more
traditional free market thinkers, most notable of the Austrian School of economic thought. An
important note is that the broader social and political ramifications of decentralization are not
discussed in this interview, which is important when considering the wholistic impact these
types of policy may have. The libertarian position with respect to these questions is not clear.
The Canadian mainstream conservative party, operating under the name of the
Conservative Party or the Progressive Conservative Party depending on time and place, does
not have any publicly available positions on central banking or monetary policy. Of the more
minor conservative Canadian parties, the Christian Heritage Party of Canada has a defined
stance on some of the Bank of Canada’s policies. Per their 2019 party platform,
Canada currently borrows operating and investment capital from other nations
and from international bankers and pays interest on the debt incurred around $70
million every single day! The CHP would restore the Bank of Canada to its proper
function. It would create and provide Canada’s money supply and provide low-interest
or interest-free loans to Provinces, crown corporations and municipalities for urgently
needed infrastructure. Current governments, through incorrect use of the Bank of
Canada, have created a blight over the futures of our children as they will be forced to
repay the debt plus interest.62
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The Libertarian Party of Canada also has a defined position with regards to the Bank of
Canada.
Canadians are seeing their bills go up without a corresponding increase in salary.
The purchasing power of our dollar is being diminished while others profit. Through the
Bank of Canada, banking institutions are allowed to create a greater supply of money,
devaluing our money - reducing our purchasing power, and then they lend it out
collecting it back with interest. This practice hurts those in a fixed income, especially
seniors and employees earning a minimum wage. Central banking is essentially legal
counterfeiting that enriches a few at the expense of the many, increases wealth
inequality, erodes buying power, constitutes a tax on the unborn, incentivizes
consumption over production, leads to a harmful business cycle of booms and busts,
creates market distortions and creates inefficient resource allocation. The Libertarian
Party seeks to end the central banks monopoly on money supply and monetary policy
and move back to a system of free banking.63
The libertarian stance in Canada is quite similar to the American libertarian stance, in
that they both advocate for the removal of a central banking authority in exchange for a private
competitive currency and banking environment.
The Heritage Foundation is a conservative think tank that generally stay mainstream in
thought. Several articles that were published on its website fall in line with more mainstream
center conservative thought on monetary policy. An article written by Michael Norbert for the
Heritage Foundation advocates for lower interest rates on the excess reserves of the primary
dealer banks during the Covid related economic circumstances.
Just like in the early stages of the 2008 crisis, now is not the time to be worried
about creating too much inflation. At worst, this move will release another $1.5 trillion
in reserves. Given the Fed’s decision to cut reserve requirements to zero, it makes even
less sense to continue paying IOER now. Yes, the IOER rate is close to zero, but what
matters is the IOER rate relative to other rates. And there simply is no reason to have a
nonzero IOER now.64
Norbert also wrote an article in 2017 that detailed his position on how central banks
should not over or under control the market, and should not give preferential treatment to
certain sectors or businesses. This is similar to Cruz’s advocacy for the oil and gas industry to
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get access to emergency credit in the same manner that other economic sectors had (detailed
above).
Good monetary policy helps Main Street America’s workers, retirees, and savers
by ensuring that the economy does not stall due to an insufficient supply of money. It
also helps Main Street by safeguarding against an excessive supply of money that could
overheat the economy. To accomplish this task, the Federal Reserve (the “Fed”) needs
to supply the amount of money the economy needs to keep moving, no more and no
less, and it needs to do so in a neutral fashion, rather than allocate credit to preferred
sectors of the economy. This standard dictates that the Fed maintain a minimal
footprint in the market so that it does not distort markets, crowd out private credit and
investment, create moral hazard problems, or transfer financial risks to taxpayers.
Finally, the Federal Reserve should conduct monetary policy in a transparent manner,
with maximum accountability to citizens through their elected representatives.65
Norbert has also written about alternative methods of providing liquidity into the
market, which could be more effective than the current primary dealer system in place today.
The Cato Institute has done a significant amount of work on analysing central banking
and monetary policy from more libertarian perspective. These views are very in line with the
political actors detailed above, and will not be elaborated on here. But an interesting note is
that some at the institute have been examining the idea of a digital central banking currency as
a means of opening up the credit markets more effectively. George Selgin wrote an article for
the Cato Institute in the spring of 2021 detailing out some of the ideas that should be
considered when analysing if central banks should have accounts for individuals as opposed to
the current system where only the primary dealers have access.
Various proposals for a central bank digital currency (CBDC) involve different
technical solutions to as many distinct problems. My concern is with the monetary
policy implications of those (e.g., Bordo and Levin 2019; Ricks 2020) that would allow
anyone to place deposits in a Fed Master Account, directly or using ordinary banks as
brokers.66
This is an idea that is being practiced to some extent in China at the time of writing, and
some of the main conversations about its implementation involve privacy concerns as well as a
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greater centralized control over capital flow and credit access. If Selgin is an advocate for this
type of policy it would be in direct contrast to traditional libertarian thought, and could indicate
an ideological split in the libertarian community.

The Populist Conservative Approach
The populist conservative movement gained traction in the last few years, not in small
part to economic issues. Attitudes towards monetary policy and central banking naturally
stemmed from major ideological differences that populist conservative have in comparison to
more traditional conservatives. This is quite similar to the differences between the more
populist liberals and the traditional liberals, with the fundamental objects of interests
respectively being the ‘ordinary’ person and broader state scaled actors such as institutions and
whole economic sectors. Though there are both nuanced and major differences between the
populist left and the populist right in terms of what actual policy should look like, they both
share the overarching view that the central banks are a tool to be used to benefit the society
via direct action, and should be more directly influenced by society to a higher degree than they
currently are.
Donald Trump was a strong advocate for lowering the Federal Reserve’s interest rates to
record levels, even suggesting negative rates, for the purpose of injecting massive liquidity into
the markets during the onset of the Covid pandemic. As reported by CNBC in January 2020,
Trump wanted to lower central bank interest rates in order for the US to become more
competitive in the global marketplace. This statement is in the context of many other countries
having historically very low interest rates, some even negative rates, and the US having not
experimented with this type of policy before. Since central bank interest rates are directly
linked to liquidity in broader markets, negative interest rates act to make accounts holding
capital at these central banks pay for the storage of funds, as opposed to the central banks
paying interest on reserves.
President Donald Trump made another pitch to the Federal Reserve to lower
interest rates, this time saying that doing so could help the U.S. pay down its burgeoning
national debt. In a tweet Tuesday morning, the president said again that the central
bank should cut its key lending rate so it’s more in line with that of its global peers.
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However, he extended the argument this time to note that cheaper debt could mean a
reduction in the national red ink. Trump urged the Fed to “get smart” and “make our
interest competitive” with other countries. “We would then focus on paying off &
refinancing debt!” he wrote.67
Trump had actively pressured the Federal Reserve chairman, at the time Jerome Powell,
to lower rates prior to Covid. In a Twitter post in October 2019, Trump criticized the magnitude
of the recent interest rate drop, advocating for a much larger drop. Trumps Tweets as reported
by CNBC, ““Jay Powell and the Federal Reserve Fail Again,” he tweeted. “No ‘guts,’ no sense, no
vision!””68.
Steve Bannon was a former aid to Trump, and is widely recognized as a right wing
populist figure. Bannon was a key player in founding and operating Breitbart News, which has
become a major news source focusing on issues from a populist perspective. Bannon has
advocated for merging the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve and the Treasury in order to
have more direct public control over monetary policy. As reported by The Deep Dive, in an
interview with Fox News, Bannon stated he wanted the government to “Merge the balance
sheet of the Fed and the Treasury and use that as a lender of last resort to actual corporations.
[…] Part of his idea is needing to find a way to get money in the hands of those on main
street”69. Bannon has also commented on cryptocurrencies in the current monetary
environment, where Coindesk reported that “Bannon said the Federal Reserve’s monetary
policy has been too tight and that cryptocurrencies present a meaningful alternative to fiatbased investments.”70. Bannon was also a big advocate for the nomination of Janet Yellen for
the position of chairman of the Federal Reserve during Trumps presidency. As reported by
Business Insider, “According to Bloomberg, Bannon wanted Yellen because her slow pace of
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monetary tightening was more likely to allow wages to increase.”71. The object of Bannon’s
interest in this case is clearly wage growth, which mainly has meaningful day to day impacts on
the lowest of wage earners.
Patrick Buchanan is a prominent conservative figure with ties to several past
presidential administrations. Buchanan is considered a populist and an anti-taxation hawk,
which is clearly reflected in his opinions on monetary policy and central bank legitimacy.
Buchanan is highly critical of quantitative easing policy and the broader monetary policy that
has stemmed from the ideological underpinnings of it. Buchanan’s main criticism of the Federal
Reserve is that the policies that it implemented have had a drastically negative impact on the
average American as well as having major impacts on the US government as a whole, mostly
through debt accumulation and the degradation of the legal bounds that the Federal Reserve is
constrained by. In response to the 2008 financial crash, Buchanan wrote an article for CNBC
where he stated
For the financial crisis that has wiped out trillions in wealth, many have felt the
lash of public outrage. Fannie and Freddie. The idiot-bankers. The AIG bonus babies. The
Bush Republicans and Barney Frank Democrats who bullied banks into making
mortgages to minorities who could not afford the houses they were moving into. But
the Big Kahuna has escaped. The Federal Reserve. "(T)he very people who devised the
policies that produced the mess are now posing as the wise public servants who will
show us the way out."72
Buchanan wrote several articles on his website, in blog format, where he was generally
critical of the Federal Reserve’s role in government debt and how the institution has acted to
allocate credit in the broader economy. For instance, Buchanan attributes the Great Depression
with the interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve.
That the Smoot-Hawley Tariff caused the Depression of the 1930s is a New Deal
myth in which America’s schoolchildren have been indoctrinated for decades. The

71

Brian, Bob. Published online February 13, 2018. https://www.businessinsider.com/steve-bannon-janet-yellenstay-fed-chair-2018-2
72
Buchanan, Patrick. Published online April 3, 2009. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna30031803

Persaud 30

Depression began with the crash of the stock market in 1929, nine months before
Smoot-Hawley became law. The real villain: The Federal Reserve…73
Clearly Buchanan is not a fan of some of the mainstream conservative or liberal
ideologies surrounding central banking, but he takes a different approach in his populist type
framework. Bannon and Trump are similar to Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez in that they view the
central bank as an instrument of use to the government, subject to oversight by, and to the
benefit of, the ‘ordinary’ person. Buchanan seems to view central banks as beholden to the
needs of the broader state, as his stance on national debt and allocating credit to private
entities suggests. Though populist policy preference by actors such as Trump or Sanders also
advocate for policies that have statewide impacts and manifestations, Buchanan considers the
long term impacts of national debt to be of interest to the people, where the other actors do
not. Buchanan is in direct policy opposition to the other populists that have so far been
discussed, mainly over the interpretation of the role of debt in the broader society.
The Social Credit Party of Canada and the Reform Party of Canada are historical political
parties that were populist in nature, with the Social Credit Party being dissolved in 1993 and the
Reform Party being dissolved in 2000. The Social Credit Party originated from an economic idea
called ‘social credit’ which attempted to address the demand side problems in early 20 th
century economics. The general idea that the social credit theory was built on was that typical
supply/demand economics fails in maximizing the value addition process of production via
distribution inefficiencies. The basis of this premise arose from the observation that the
expenditures of large businesses (including dividends, salaries, material costs, etc..) did not add
to the total revenue of those businesses, which is an inherent systematic loss due to the
structure of the business itself. The social credit theory aimed to address these systematic
inefficiencies, which were viewed as a means of reducing the quality of life of citizens, by using
money as means of distributing purchasing power instead of as a direct measure of economic
value. The social credit model makes a clear distinction between economic production and
actual money, and aims to move control of monetary production and distribution away from
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banks and other financial institutions towards more democratic institutions such as
government bodies. Social credit theory has some similarities to Keynesian economics in that
both theories attempt to improve the efficiency in models addressing the central economic
problem from the demand side as opposed to the supply side, where social credit theory
acknowledges there is very good evidence of success already. The main purpose of economic
and monetary policy according to social credit theory is to make the production of society work
for the people in a more meaningful manner in relation to more classical economic models.
These were the main conservative populist parties in Canada while they were active,
with the Peoples Party being the modern conservative populist party, which is relatively new.
There is not much information regarding the positions of these parties outside of their direct
platforms, and not much context given the time that they existed. Below are some direct
quotes from various party manifestoes, note that the Peoples Party manifesto does not have
any mention of central banking or monetary policy at the time of writing.
From the Reform Party of Canada’s 1989 manifesto,
The Reform Party supports a truly national monetary policy - a slow but steady
growth in the money supply. We are opposed to the recent high interest rate, high
exchange rate, tight money policy of the Bank of Canada, supported by the Minister of
Finance. We believe it is inappropriate to use national macroeconomic policy to address
the regional problems of Southern Ontario. The inflationary problems of Southern
Ontario should be addressed by attacking their causes - excessive spending by both
levels of government and the rental and housing policies of the Government of
Ontario.74
From the Reform Party of Canada’s 1991 manifesto,
The Reform Party has opposed the high interest rate, high exchange rate, tight
money policy of the Bank of Canada, supported by the Minister of Finance. We believe
that it is inappropriate to use national macroeconomic policy to address the regional
problems of areas with high inflation.75
From the Reform Party of Canada’s 1996 manifesto,
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The Reform Party supports the adoption of a process whereby appointments to
the Board of Directors of the Bank of Canada would be made by the provincial
legislatures rather than by the Prime Minister.76
From the Social Credit Party of Canada’s 1972 manifesto,
The Bank of Canada must satisfy the needs of the public sector on a debt free
basis. Canadian citizens will then be able freely to decide on their own investment
policies. Then Canadian based businesses will progressively become the property of
Canadians. […]. A Social Credit government will establish a modern and scientific
monetary system which will allow neither inflation nor deflation, and which will give the
Parliament of Canada - operating through the Bank of Canada - full control over the
money supply and credit. A competent, impartial body will regulate the money supply,
which would be restricted by only the limitations of our natural resources and variations
in the activity of the population. A Social Credit government will make use of the
services of the Bank of Canada to provide loans to the provinces at the cost of
administration as a means of financing major public projects, such as construction of
government buildings. hospitals. schools, and other public works.77
From the Social Credit Party of Canada’s 1968 manifesto,
The Government of Canada could withdraw excessive credit when necessary to
control inflation. The progressive transfer to the Bank of Canada of the national debt
and its orderly and ultimate liquidation. […]. The extension of the functions of the Bank
of Canada to include: 1) Making available to the provinces and their municipalities,
capital for public facilities necessary to provide essential services. 2) The provision,
directly or indirectly, of capital necessary for economic and industrial projects
considered vital to the economy and wellbeing of the nation but of such a nature that
they cannot be expected to attract private capital through ordinary channels. […]. The
effective regulation of the nation's aggregate supply of money and credit to ensure a
proper balance between consumer purchasing power and gross national production,
including flexible measures to control both inflationary and deflationary trends and
preserve the value of the Canadian dollar.78
From the Social Credit Party of Canada’s 1965 manifesto,
Social Credit government will establish a modern and scientific monetary system,
without inflation or deflation, and give the Canadian Parliament control of our money
supply and credit through the Bank of Canada.79
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It seems that the Reform Party advocates for a more regional approach to monetary
policy, where national policy is not used to solve regional problems. They also advocate for
control over the Bank of Canada to be subjected to provincial oversight, as opposed to
oversight by the federal government. This falls in line with general populist approaches, where
regional control over regional circumstances are viewed as a good way to help the people on
the ground, the regular folk so to say. This would also tend to increase regional policy
competition. The Social Credit Party take a different approach, one which had ideological
similarities to Trumps and Sanders. They see the Bank of Canada as being a tool for the federal
government to use in implementing lending programs to provinces, businesses, and individuals.
The Social Credit Party advocates for no interest loans as a means of spurring economic activity
on the local level, while also advocating for the ability for the federal government to withdraw
credit when it deems fit. It is interesting to note that the major difference between these two
parties with respect to the Bank of Canada’s policy reach and restrictions is that one is
expansionist and the other is reductionist. This mirrors the difference between the
Trump/Bannon ideological camp and the Buchanan ideological camp.

The Debate Over Quantitative Easing
Quantitative easing is the process of a central bank purchasing assets from private or
public firms and institutions in order to maintain monetary liquidity in the market. The policy of
quantitative easing has been implemented when typical monetary policy was deemed
insufficient to address the liquidity issues in the economy80. Normally when financial
institutions do not have enough money to function, they acquire loans from the central bank,
with the central bank holding assets as collateral. The normative collateral takes the form of US
treasury bills which are deemed a type of debt with the lowest risk of default, thus the central
bank can ensure the repayment of the loan. In the case where financial institutions do not have
enough treasuries to meet their loan requirements, central banks will start to allow less pristine
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types of collateral to be used such as mortgage backed securities and other types of bond debt.
This type of monetary policy was completely new for both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of
Canada in a historical context. The scope of the types of assets used as collateral as well as the
shear magnitude of the central bank purchases was far and beyond anything that was
considered a historical norm. In the case of the 2008 financial crisis, there was not enough
pristine collateral to cover the loans that financial institutions required, thus quantitative easing
was implemented by the Federal Reserve81. The Federal Reserve has interjected into the
market prior to the more modern 2008 financial crisis, where there is precedent of a balance
sheet increase following the great depression of the 1930’s, where the Federal Reserve’s assets
increased substantially82 but the collateral used were treasuries and not the mortgage backed
securities and corporate bonds used in 2008. The 2008 type of central bank asset accumulation
was unprecedented in both scope and magnitude and was marketed to the public as an
emergency measure83. Though it was expansive, the amount of liquidity injected into the
market was capped and re-evaluated at regular intervals which allowed for a level of oversight
by the Federal Reserve’s board members. Other central banks such as the Bank of Japan, the
European Central Bank, and to a lesser extent the Bank of Canada have generally followed the
arc of the Federal Reserve’s policy.
The debate over the use of, and legitimacy of, quantitative easing can be broken into
two camps. The first is the group that accepts this type of monetary policy as legitimate, and
the second does not. The stance that a political actor takes with regards to the legitimacy issue
can be analysed through direct or indirect means, as in direct statements made about
legitimacy or statements that can indirectly imply support/opposition for/of legitimacy. For
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example, if a figure praises the use of capital produced via quantitative easing, they indirectly
support the legitimacy of the policy that led to the result. This is a causal premise of this project
and is used to help simplify the analysis, though this is not strictly necessary in a logical sense. A
figure could not support the legitimacy of the policy, but support some outcome resulting from
it. This would seem to be an outlier set of conditions and there would have to be meaningful
evidence of this case in order for it to be considered here. Due to the limited data set, it will be
assumed that legitimacy views are directly tied to policy outcome type views.
The most notable grouping that pops up in the data is that most of the political actors in
this study seem to support the legitimacy of the central banks quantitative easing policies.
There is contentious debate about how quantitative easing policy should be implemented,
utilized, managed, ect, but most of the actors support its underlying authority. This should not
come as a surprise if the circumstances are analysed through the prism of general institutional
legitimacy, as has been discussed in earlier sections. If there was some meaningful level of
authoritative debate surrounding the issue, there would tend to be pushback from other
institutional actors as well as general sociopolitical actors. The greater the pushback, the
greater the quantitative easing policy would be narrowly tailored, or stopped altogether.
Congress, the Executive branch, and the Supreme Court (in the American case) have not taken
steps to curtail central bank authority even as the Federal Reserve expanded its policy scope
and its rational for implementing policy. The other, smaller actors, such as banks, academic
institutions, ect, have also not made significant attempts to curtail these new policies. If we
examine this in the context of mandate flexibility and stability, as discussed in the background
section, we have to naturally come to the conclusion that the broader institutional environment
accepts the level of flexibility that the central banks have demonstrated in their policy. This is
not to say that there is no debate surrounding the legitimacy, there are elements of the
libertarian and populist conservative movements that reject these policies for various reasons,
but they are the significant minority in the entirety of the discussion.
So where exactly is there debate on quantitative easing, if not surrounding the
legitimacy of such policy? According to the data in this study it seems that the debate is
centered on how and when the tool of quantitative easing should be used. The populists, both
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on the left and the right, tend to see the central bank as being an extension of the government,
with central banking policy being an extension of government policy. Whether it is to
redistribute capital, inflate away debt, or to fund government expenditures, the populists want
to wield the central banks to work more directly on behalf of the ‘ordinary people’. An
exception to this observation is the Buchanan types, who are more directed towards viewing
national debt and creditor confidence as being in the interest of the people. In this case both
the majority populist and the Buchanan populist groups have historical evidence to support
their views, both credit crunches/debt defaults and positive stimulus injections have occurred
to various degrees of outcome.
The main divergence in the debate between the more populist types and the more
mainstream political actors is in how quantitative easing should be utilized. The populist types
want the resulting money to be directed towards individual people via various methods, while
the mainstream types aim to divert resources towards groups. In the case of some of the
traditional liberals, there was an overwhelming desire to use quantitative easing as a pseudotax in order to fund wealth redistribution programs based on race. Other mainstream liberals
wanted to use this monetary policy to assist corporations or industrial bodies, in a nearly
identical fashion to the mainstream conservatives. These groups advocate for the use of the
central bank as a direct lender and bailout instrument for industry. This is an interesting note
because direct bailouts and corporate bond buying required Congressional approval in 2008,
but advocates in 2020 are not suggesting legislation as the driver of this policy, rather they are
encouraging the Federal Reserve to act independently.

Discussion of Future Research and Concluding Thoughts
This section aims to provide a brief background on the theory behind the linear left-right
political spectrum, as well as some of the theory that aims to explain behavioral and policy
differences between different elements on the spectrum. The goal of this section is to provide a
framework for connecting the moral and philosophical foundations of elements on the left-right
spectrum with the data and observations in this study. Though this study is constrained mainly
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to data collection and a narrow analysis, this work can easily be extended into, and connected
with, the broader body of theoretical work in socio-political philosophy.
The most common approach to classifying political entities is also one of the simplest
and easiest to intuitively understand, which is the left-right spectrum. This model attempts to
describe political ideology by projecting it onto a one-dimensional continuous graph that
displays the extent that a position is ‘left’ or ‘right’. Left of the center of the graph is commonly
described as liberal, while right of the center is commonly described as conservative. The terms
liberal and conservative are quite ambiguous in common discussions because they are broad
labels that encapsulate a variety of ideological positions. The shear number of various ideas
that can be politically relevant makes broad group classifications difficult at best, and
impossible at worse. So the question needs to be asked as to why this model is so common
place in not only layman political discourse but in academia as well. The answer has two
components, the first is that simple models are often useful even if they lack precision, the
second is that more complex models can often be reasonably projected onto the simple linear
model without losing significant theoretical utility. The policy positions of political actors tend
to bunch together when analyzing a sample of individuals and making statistical inferences that
determine their ‘likeness’.
That is, a voter’s positions on political issues appear to be correlated, and so can
be succinctly summarized by the voter’s ideology, as indexed on a one-dimensional scale
ranging from very liberal to moderate to very conservative. In the words of Converse
(1964, p. 207), ...if a person is opposed to the expansion of social security, he is probably
a conservative and is probably opposed as well to any nationalization of private
industries, federal aid to education, sharply progressive income taxation, and so forth.84
There are two main conceptual frameworks to classify the linear model of the left-right
spectrum. The first is the policy content method, where actual policy positions are determined,
and the superposition of the collective positions are then projected onto the linear spectrum 85.
This is similar to the proposition provided by McMurry in his multi-dimensional analysis. The
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second main method is coined the ‘vanilla approach’, and involves using inductive reasoning to
find the main issues that a region on the spectrum considers most important86. This method is
used to attempt to address the temporal aspect of politics, where the policy positions of a
political actor can change over time. It attempts to address this by fixing actors somewhere on
the spectrum based on the most important issues, and defining the actual spectrum subtleties
based on the positions of those actors, not the minor issue themselves. It is the classic
philosophical labeling conundrum of either classifying based on an a priori set of conditions, or
classifying by inference. Both these approaches can be used to gain insight into a particular set
of circumstances, and both have been applied to analysing the political actors in this paper. This
will inevitably pose a challenge when analysing party manifestoes and platforms, as both
approaches can lead to conflicting conclusions. This is understood to be the reality of this
project, but the essence of the project is to gain insight and not to draw any definitive
conclusions or to make grandiose proclamations.
An interesting facet of political policy positions is the moral underpinnings of said
positions. The ‘why and how’ of both the theoretical base of the policy and the actual
implementation of policy. Research on the moral basis of policy positions blends political
science and psychology and has a presence in the literature. Based on the Model of Moral
Motives87 the moral rational behind specific behaviour patterns can be used to project moral
groundings onto political policy preferences. What does a specific person justify their
preferences on, for instances do they have an inclination to ‘not harm’ or to ‘help’? These are
distinct moral motives that are not equal and are not opposing either, they are categorically
different in that the method of action is distinct. This means that ‘not harming’ is choosing to
not act, where ‘helping’ is choosing to act. Bulman and Carnes analysed three research studies
that aimed to address moral foundations for various social policy preferences. They found that
self identified conservatives leaned towards policy that favored social order, and self identified
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liberals leaned towards policy that favored social justice. An excerpt of the paper is below that
describes these two moral foundations in the context of the model of moral motives.
There are two group moral motives in MMM: Social Order (proscriptive) and
Social Justice (prescriptive). Most generally, Social Order is in the service of collective
coordination, and is particularly responsive to dangers and threats to the group,
whether physical threats to safety or psychological threats to identity. A Social Order
morality emphasizes the importance of group conformity and strict adherence to
behavioral norms; self-interest and individual self expression are constrained in the
service of the larger group’s interests. Social Justice involves communal responsibility
and activates collective efforts to advance the group’s welfare. There is a particular
focus on equality-based distributional justice. Most generally, a Social Order morality is
oriented towards protecting the group, whereas a Social Justice morality is oriented
towards providing for the group.88
It becomes clear that the research shows divides between the social based moral roots
of conservatives and liberals, where conservative are geared towards protecting the group and
liberals are geared towards tending to the group. It goes without saying that both elements are
necessary for the long-term success of any group. The psychological foundations of
conservative and liberal policy preferences run much deeper than group level policy. The
differences also appear on the level of the individual behaviour regulation89.
More specifically, past research has found that conservatives are more reactive
to threat, display greater disgust sensitivity, have greater category restrictiveness, are
more apt to be the product of restrictive parenting, focus on losses rather than gains
and show a general negativity bias; in contrast, liberals exhibit greater openness to
experience, engage in more exploratory behaviors, are more apt to be the product of
egalitarian parenting, and focus on gains rather than losses [20–34]. Conservatives’
greater avoidance orientation and liberals’ greater approach orientation provide a basis
for the proposed differences found in group morality, because Social Order is a
proscriptive avoidance-based moral motive, whereas Social Justice is a prescriptive,
approach-based moral motive.90
The differences between conservatives and liberals appears to be mostly oriented
around group dynamics. On the level of intrapersonal and interpersonal relationships, both
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conservatives and liberals have very similar moral foundations91. Libertarians seem to
fundamentally reject any type of separation between group and individual interactions, basing
their moral foundation on individual action that aggregates into group settings92.
Populism tends to be viewed as the extreme ends of the left-right spectrum, with left
wing populists and right wing populists. Sometimes referred to by different names, but in any
case the arbitrary placement of populist ideology at the ends of the left-right spectrum is not
accurate with respect to either the vanilla or policy preference methods of classification.
Populist movements tend to share very similar ideological frameworks, but often differ in the
placement of various ‘objects’ within that framework. This fundamentally shifts the
classification problems from the framework to the objects, and creates a second level of depth
when looking through a one-dimensional left-right model. How are these secondary levels of
analysis superimposed onto the singular dimension of a line? An attempt can be inferred from
some fundamental axioms that were discussed above, meaning we can attempt to base a
primary positioning of various populisms on moral underpinnings of secondary qualities. The
literature presents us with the idea that populism is a ‘thin’ ideology that is overlayed onto the
traditional left-right notions of politics which is a ‘thick’ ideology. 93
As a ‘thin ideology’, populism provides an interconnected set of ideas that derive
meaning from their relationship to one another. These core aspects manifest
discursively in different ways but they are almost always present in any occurrence of
populism.94
Populism manifests with certain underlying pieces to its framework, which tend to be
the same along the entirety of the left-right spectrum. The central keystone is always the idea
that ‘the people’ are competing with ‘the elites’, but the flavors that make up ‘the people’ and
‘the elites’ change based on specific local ideological conditions. When Gilles et al95 conducted
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an analysis of some European populist parties, they found that the political class was consistent
in what each party viewed as part of the elites. The parties that were analysed seemed to claim
that a modern day caste system exists, with the elite group at the top, and the regular people at
the bottom. Beyond the political class is where some divergences start to appear, with different
parties having differing claims as to who exactly comprises the elite group. Common culprits
include academics, businesspeople, and the media. It is important to note that the groups
identified are quite abstract in essence, though may be less abstract in substance. This seems
true because an academic can be selected quite easily, say pointing to a university professor,
but what is the essence that makes an academic outside of a given title? Though the logical
structure of classification reasoning can be explored, for the sake of this paper it is not strictly
necessary because all that matters is the populist’s perception of an academic, not the ‘actual’
thing that is an academic.
Populists tend to view themselves as representing the regular people, or the majority of
the population. This is the central element that they use to define what ‘the people’ mean
when viewing the caste system that they believe exists. This abstraction that is ‘the people’
seems self evident to most onlookers because of the observers preconceived notions of
who/what regular people are, and as is common to human observers, projects their intuitive
understanding of ‘the people’ onto the world around them. The problem that naturally arises is
that intuitions vary across observers, and the abstraction that is ‘the people’ becomes less
resolute on deeper examination. A potential strategy for a more defined political classification
of ‘the people’ is to define the majority by some set of parameters that are common across the
group, and have the parameters be such that the similarities within the group are more
significant than the differences. Simultaneously an outside minority group will be formed as a
consequence of this type of organizing.
Populism typically involves the construction of the people as a global political
subject, ignoring the plurality of demands from a variety of social groups. Stanley (2008:
96) argues that “populism is therefore not to be found in the content of any particular
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appeal to the people, but in the degree to which the logic of equivalence prevails over
that of difference”.96
With the above in mind, how can we view the data in this study through the lens of the
moral underpinnings of the left-right spectrum and of populism? The most obvious observation
is in the populist/mainstream divide, where the populists on the left and the right both view
‘the people’ as being the objects of their policy interests. It is important to note that who ‘the
people’ are is not clear, as indicated in the literature. The ‘people’ from the point of view of
Ocasio-Cortez, Sanders, Trump, and Bannon are not the same ‘people’ as the Buchanan type,
though arguments can be made that the left-right populist divide also has differences in who
‘the people’ are, these groups are more similar in the context of this project than different. In
the Canadian context this is reflected as well, where the Social Credit Party and the Reform
Party both have a distinct difference in their objects of interest. Future work could be done on
examining some of the deeper questions that naturally arise from this dynamic. It is notable
that the protective/nurturing dynamic that is discussed above does not seem obvious in the
data on monetary policy. This holds true if the self identified approach to left-right classification
is used, but may not hold true when applying the policy content method. The issue arises of
how to define leftness in the case of the liberals, where Biden and Booker have distinct policy
stances with respect to Schumer and Warren. Is Cruz functional liberal with respect to
quantitative easing, since he shares a domain with Schumer? Or is Warren functionally
conservative since she shares views with Cruz? Is a race oriented policy more left than an
economical needs based policy? There are many questions that stem from the analysis of
monetary policy positions, and a cross domain comparison study would be a recommended
path to deeper understanding of leftness and rightness in this context. All in all there seems to
be distinct groupings of policy interests and a general sense of institutional legitimacy behind
modern quantitative easing policy.
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